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FROM EARLY IN HIS THINKING Heidegger subordinated the question of 
ethics to the question of Being. Like other ontical matters, ethics could not 
be addressed adequately until the ontological question of Dasein's general mode 
of Being was given priority. I Heidegger often indicated that this should not be 
taken to mean a rejection of, or indifference toward, ethics; rather, ethics, again 
like other ontic regions, has concealed within its mode of thinking a primordial 
dimension that can open up the way in which Dasein is in the world. My reading 
of this ontic-ontological differentiation is as follows. Ethics is rich in its analysis 
of normative topics but poor in attention to our being-ethical-in-the-world, in the 
fullest sense that Heidegger would give to such a phrase. This coordination of 
ethics and ontology suggests the possibility of taking up ethics anew once we 
have clarified the overall existential constitution of Dasein. Although Heidegger 
often gives the impression of segregating ontology from "practical" disciplines 
like ethics, I am convinced that this was an analytical division and not a 
substantive one. 2 Much in the early Heidegger has seemed promising for an 
investigation of ethics. 3 But there is also a good deal of suspicion about the ethical 
possibilities in Heidegger (notably in the work of Habermas and Levinas). Given 
the Olympian distance of Heidegger's later thought (e.g., the claim that Denken 
has "no result" and "no effect"4) and given his fascist politics together with the 
deceit and galling silence of the postwar years, the segregation of ethics from 
ontology can be interpreted as a more heinous division-that Heidegger's thought 
was or became indifferent to ethics, or worse, inseparable from something dark 
and barbaric. 
I am not entirely swayed by this suspicion. I am one of those who believes that 
we can distinguish Heidegger the human being from his thought in some way. We 
'See Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 
1962), p. 37. 
2See ibid., pp. 340-41 and 332. 
'See, e.g., The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana 
Univ. Press, 1982), section 13, where Heidegger gives a very positive analysis of Kant's notions of 
moral personhood and respect, followed by a typical critique in section 14 that Kant's analysis does 
not go far enough ontologically. For an extended discussion of the possibilities for ethics drawn from 
Heidegger's response to Kant, see Frank Schalow, Imagination and Existence: Heidegger's Retrieval 
of the Kantian Ethic (Lanham: Univ. Press of America, 1986) and The Renewal of the Heidegger-
Kant Dialogue: Action, Thought, and Responsibility (Albany: SUNY Press, 1992). 
4Letter on Humanism, in Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper and Row, 
1977), p. 236. 
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can even distinguish Heidegger's extant thought from the potential for ethical 
thinking contained therein (in all periods of his thought, but especially in the early 
writings). Moreover, I also think it is possible to show in some measure that 
Heidegger's political commitments were not consistent with certain basic ele-
ments of his thought and its ethical implications. This is not to deny that 
Heidegger himself affirmed an idealized version of National Socialism that fol-
lowed his thought in essential ways. My motive is not to rehabilitate Heidegger 
but to explore the ways in which his thinking can make an important contribution 
to ethics, and I aim to do this in terms offamiliar intellectual concerns and social 
applications, not through some arcane circulation of Heideggerian terminology. 
This is my project, then, and one that I will not shy away from calling moral 
philosophy; but most of my inspiration has come from Heidegger's way of 
thinking. 5 
Moral philosophy must give up the model of ethical "theory," the insistence 
on rational justification, and the privileging of abstract principles over concrete 
situations. Ethics should be understood as the heuristic engagement of basic 
practical questions: How should human beings live? How should we live together? 
What are better and worse ways of conducting our lives? Moreover, ethics must 
acknowledge a prephilosophical, traditional heritage that presents us with a 
degree of consensus ahead of time regarding better and worse ways of living (this 
is an Aristotelian point reaffirmed by Heidegger). Taking our own society, we 
tend to agree already in a rough fashion and to a certain extent that lying, 
stealing, and killing are undesirable actions, that injustice, violence, cruelty, and 
indifference are worse than fairness, kindness, and concern. I dare say that such 
values are not unique to our culture or time either. 6 The task of philosophy would 
not be to put our entire moral outlook into question or to discover some brand 
new system of values (nothing so radical has ever happened in history). Rather, 
moral philosophy should engage a fivefold task: (1) analyze moral values as 
cultural phenomena; (2) clarify the meaning of the values and norms we inherit; 
(3) ask the question: Why should people be ethical in this way? This question is 
not a call for demonstration or proof to banish doubt or disagreement but rather 
an existential and pedagogical question to address the developments, conflicts, 
'Some other studies that take up the issue of Heidegger and ethics and related topics in the 
Continental tradition include two works by Werner Marx. Is There a Measure on Earth": Foundations 
for a Nonmetaphysical Ethics, trans. Thomas J. Nenon and Reginald Lilly (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago 
Press, 1987) and Towards a Phenomenological Ethics: Ethics and the Life-World, trans. Stefaan 
Heyvaert (Albany: SUNY Press, 1992); Charles E. Scott, The Question of Ethics: Nietzsche, 
Foucault, Heidegger (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1990); Ethics and Danger: Essays on 
Heidegger and Continental Thought, ed. Arleen B. Dallery and Charles E. Scott with P. Holley 
Roberts (Albany: SUNY Press, 1992); and Richard J. Bernstein, The New Constellation: The Ethical-
Political Horizons of ModernitylPostmodernity (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992). A recent study that 
came to my attention too late to work into this essay is Lawrence Vogel, The Fragile "We": Ethical 
Implications of Heidegger's Being and Time (Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press. 1994). 
6Although there is certainly much disagreement and controversy in ethical matters, students are 
misled when we concentrate primarily on dilemmas and disputes in moral considerations or on the 
shortcomings of moral paradigms. We should at least start with areas of agreement (for example, all 
students agree that they should be graded fairly) before we take up controversies, to avoid the 
impression (very common among students) that moral values are completely undecidable. Stressing 
"lifeboat" scenarios, for example. is like beginning physics instruction with the uncertainty principle 
or the wave-particle paradox. 
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and tensions in the ethical life. In other words, moral philosophy should be 
inseparable from moral education. It should (4) ask the related questions: How 
do people become ethical or unethical? What conditions or attributes or develop-
ments are involved in actualizing or blocking ethical potential? And moral 
philosophy should (5) submit the tradition to critique in order to uncover internal 
inconsistencies, conflicts, or failures and to discover innovations needed to revise 
or alter tradition. 
Given the difficulties that moral philosophy has faced so far in meeting this task, 
I think that ethics could benefit from Heidegger's thought in a way comparable to 
his revision of traditional ontology. Heidegger never claimed that rational or 
metaphysical models of thought are false or dispensable,7 only that they are not 
primordial enough, that something is concealed in their disclosures-the radical 
finitude of Being-that needs drawing out to renovate our thinking about the 
world. Heidegger also never denied the importance of ethics or the need for it in 
our critical time of history.8 I would propose an analogy between Heidegger's 
approach to traditional ontology and a possible approach to ethics. Traditional 
ethical theories are not false or dispensable; they all show us something important 
about morality. But they have missed or covered over the radical finitude of 
human existence and the preconceptual lived world, attention to which can 
renovate our thinking about ethics. So the ethics that is put in question would be 
the traditional philosophical and metaphysical presumptions about moral values 
and not the matter (die Sache) of how we should live our lives. If we attend in a 
Heideggerian manner to the existential environment (being-in-the-world) in which 
and out of which the ethical life arises, such a "pre-ethical" analysis should give 
us clues for a more adequate ethics in regard to its fivefold task described above. 
In the light of Heidegger's thought ethics can be seen as a finite, existential, 
ungrounded world dynamic, a configuration that I think can significantly improve 
upon traditional models in moral philosophy. 
The task for ethics should not be the search for a theory or principle that can 
survive rational scrutiny, that can satisfy the objective cognitive standards inher-
ited from traditional logic and the sciences, that can give us clear and certain 
criteria to guide adjudication. We already are shaped by ethics, before we reflect 
on it. We must attend to this prereflective ethical world to understand better how 
values function in our experience, to open up the ethical life, its conditions, 
demands, and difficulties. In this way ethics is not simply a philosophical specialty 
but a social project that keeps the existential claim of morality alive as an issue 
that people must continually engage. And I think that Heidegger's constellation 
of being-in-the-world can be effectively translated to prepare such an approach. 
I. BEING-ETHICAL-IN-THE-WORLD 
Many ethical theories have searched for an objective, rational standard that can 
be as decisive in morality as in the domains of mathematics, logic, and the 
sciences (e.g., Platonic forms, the Kantian categorical imperative, the utilitarian 
7See, e.g., Letter on Humanism, p. 210. 
·See ibid., pp. 231-32, and Nietzsche, trans. Frank A. Capuzzi, vol. 4 (New York: Harper and Row, 
1982), p. 245. 
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happiness calculus). One way or another the hope is that we can discover a 
measure to legislate the affective conflicts and empirical contingencies of the 
ethical field. From a Heideggerian perspective the futility of such a search is 
forcefully shown in the fact that even the most objective ontologies are dec on-
structed into the dynamics of an existential lived world. Since no form of 
knowledge can claim a purely objective, fixed warrant, it is short work to show 
that objective certainty is a chimera in ethics. Being-ethical-in-the-world can 
be specifically drawn along the same lines as Heidegger's general ontological 
configuration. Everyday normative involvement gives us access to a non-cognitive 
environment that opens up the following conditions. The radical finitude of being-
toward-death is the existential thrust of care, the urgency of concern for our 
possibilities in the world that can bear us in, and in which we can bear, our 
finitude. Human norms are fully intelligible in such a setting as various modes of 
"shelter" for beings that are continually subjected to conditions of finitude: 
death, loss, pain, failure, etc. But norms as such are no less finite than the world 
in which they arise, so "having norms" must be understood in terms of the 
conditions uncovered in an existential analysis: temporality, historicality, uncon-
cealment, facticity, particularity, plurality-none of which can support the 
search for an objective standard. 
One insight that a Heideggerian analysis can give to ethics is this: we are not 
first or finally ethical in an objective manner, by way of some theory or rational 
demonstration, which operates by reflectively standing back from world involve-
ment. We are first introduced to values by way of training, habits, and institutional 
influences, i.e., by way of a tradition already in place that gives us our ethical 
orientation in a prereflective immersion and transmission. Values become part of 
our nature before we reflect on them, and there is no reason to think that such a 
prereflective dimension ever can be or should be dissociated from the moral life. 
Even after maturation and reflection, being ethical will not be free of traditional 
influences, will not be detachable from our particular existential concerns, and 
will always require the moments of decision where reflection leaves off and 
action begins. 
Being and Time gives us a model for orchestrating this range of non-cognitive 
elements: Dasein is first molded by a traditional heritage, in a self-world immer-
sional whole that precedes subject-object differentiation; Dasein's concern for its 
existential possibilities, which concern is "mine" (cf. Jemeinigkeit), is never 
absent in its deliberations; and each Dasein is faced with the possibility of 
authentically taking up its traditional heritage in a unique way, in terms of 
decisions that will open up individual pathways in the course of life. All of 
this-precognitive training, existential concern, and decision-shows the short-
comings in purely objective. rational moral theories. 
In some respects there is historical precedent for the kind of ethical analysis I 
am trying to draw from Being and Time, namely, the ethics of Aristotle. The 
recent publication of an early lecture course, Phiinomenologische Interpretatio-
nen zu Aristoteles,9 gives us some fascinating material regarding both the relation-
ship between Heidegger's and Aristotle's thought and the possibilities for ethics 
"Gesamlau.l/?ahe, Band 61 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1985). 
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in Heidegger's early ontology.1O In this text Heidegger mentions the problems in 
absolutistic, transcendental moral systems owing to their detachment from a 
more worldly, finite, lived morality.l1 It is Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, 
particularly its critique of Platonic moral philosophy, that gives Heidegger a 
historical focus for another beginning, both in ontology and in ethics. Aristotle 
presents a phenomenology of ethics in that he does not bracket tradition or 
experience; he examines what "appears" (phainesthai) in culture and then 
submits it to analysis, clarification, and puzzle resolution (l14Sb3-7). What is 
shown are a number of elements that disrupt the Platonic tendency toward 
rationalistic, universalistic, and perfectionistic conceptions of goodness. The 
good will be a human good (109Sb3, 1178aS-lS) reflecting the finite conditions of 
a desiring being, not to be measured against divine perfection; the good first 
requires habituation (l103b24-2S), then mature deliberation in the complex 
choices of life; the good is pluralized, not uniform (1096a24-2S), particular, not 
universal, inexact, not precise (1094b20-2S), difficult, not easy (l106b30-3S). 
In a similar manner Heidegger suggests an ethics that will accord more with the 
human world, that will renounce the comfortable, undisturbed, lofty distances of 
moral theories that in their insulation foreclose any realization of ethical possibili-
ties in the actual experience of finite conditions. 12 One interesting connection 
in this regard is that between Verstehen (Heidegger's notion of prereflective 
understanding) and Aristotle's phronesis or practical wisdom. Phronesis is an 
inexact, deliberative finesse that guides our actions regarding a desired end 
(telos) , that for the sake of which (hou heneka) we act. Here the human good 
involves natural potentialities that we strive to actualize through deliberative 
choices. This fits Heidegger's sense of Verstehen, which is connected with 
Seinkonnen (Dasein's potentiality-for-being), and das Umwillen (the for-the-
sake-of that animates Dasein's actions). Ethics, for Aristotle, involves human 
potentials and the means and conditions needed to actualize these ends. A similar 
kind of ethical developmentalism can be read out of Being and Time, although 
there we notice a radicalization of Aristotle's formulations. The Kierkegaardian 
influences in Being and Time show an even more dynamic, open, and contingent 
atmosphere than Aristotle would allow. For Heidegger, Dasein's potentiality is 
never filled up in any way or even compensated for by the comfort taken in a 
metaphysics of divine actuality. Dasein is potentiality, and so full actuality is 
ruled out in principle. Moreover, despite the acceptance of tradition in Heideg-
ger's analysis, the notion of authenticity opens up issues relating to the tension 
between individuation and conformity, which goes far beyond the gesture toward 
particularity in Aristotle and which presents a more contemporary range of 
ethical topics regarding how we should engage social norms and controls. 
The focus on potentiality in Being and Time permits two basic applications that 
pertain to ethics. First, so many of our values address the supports for and 
obstacles to human development (e.g., homelife, child rearing, meaningful work, 
!OSee John van Buren, "The Young Heidegger, AIistotle, Ethics," in Ethics and Danger, pp. 169-85. 
See also Robert Bernasconi, "Heidegger's Destruction of Phronesis," The Southern Journal of 
Philosophy 28, supplement (1990),127-47, which includes a survey of the literature on this topic. 
llGesamtausgabe, 61, p. 64. 
l2See ibid., pp. 164-65. 
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social relationships, cultural pursuits). On a political level certain social programs 
should be seen to stem from asking basic ethical questions: What are the desirable 
ends of human activity? What are the ways in which a human life can flourish and 
tum out well? What are the material, environmental, and educational needs that 
make such flourishing more likely? 
Second, ethics itself is a human potential, the possibility of becoming a person 
who can live well with others. Attention to the human condition in all its 
facets would be an essential ingredient in moral education. The kind of analysis 
Heidegger offers in Being and Time is useful because it helps us understand what 
becoming ethical involves or requires-not simply moral education but knowing 
how values constitute our very being-in-the-world and what it takes to be able to 
enact our values. Attention to our sense of self and to the existential demands 
and difficulties of the ethical life have usually not been the focus of moral 
philosophy. I will develop some examples that address this problem shortly. 
II. BEING-ETHICAL-IN-THE-WORLD: THE PROBLEM OF SUBJECTIVITY 
It seems that ethics must involve something of a "call," something having a 
claim on us, something that draws us and motivates a commitment in the midst of 
counter-impulses. Such a call need not reflect the traditional force of a "com-
mand," but since normative matters always imply the human potential to alter 
one's behavior in the face of other (and likely more ready) inclinations, then some 
sense of a "self-transcendence" is needed to capture the tone of "obligation" 
that seems so indigenous to ethics. In this regard I think that Heidegger's 
ontological critique of subjectivity can also bear fruit in moral philosophy. 13 Many 
problems in ethical theory can be traced to the modernist tendency to ground 
values in a "subject," variously conceived in individual, collective, or cognitive 
terms. One way or another, Hume's division of fact and value retains its force as 
long as values are restricted to a subjective realm when measured against, and 
not measuring up to, the strict conditions of scientific objectivity. But since 
Heidegger's thought permits a deconstruction of objectivity, this opens up the 
possibility of reconciling the fact-value divorce that has made ethics so problem-
atic since the Modem period. 
Consider emotivism, the notion that moral values are merely an expression of 
affective preferences that have no cognitive status. A phenomenology of values 
would, I think, call into question the idea that my objections to torture, for 
example, are nothing more than personal preferences (and what could I say about 
those whose preferences support torture?). And is the objection to fraud in 
scientific research nothing more than a preference? Consider also moral egoism, 
which in my view amounts to an oxymoron. In effect it says that the right thing 
to do is whatever an individual wants to do-when it is this very condition of 
individuals pursuing any and every desire that generates normative thinking in 
the first place. Individual subjectivity, then, is somewhat incoherent as an ethical 
reference, and it certainly seems to lack any sense of a "call" (what would it 
mean to say that I am obligated to follow my desires?). 
Utilitarianism is somewhat of an improvement in asking individuals to adjust 
13See, e.g., Werner Marx, Is There a Measure on Earth? ch. 2. 
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their actions to the general well-being of the community. But the community in 
this case is simply an aggregate of individual subjectivities, which does not 
therefore supercede the assumption that the good is nothing more than an internal 
affection having no external claim. Moreover, the criterion of collectivity contains 
the danger of majoritarian tyranny that has often plagued this theory, and 
the emphasis on instrumental reason seems to leave no room for the dignity 
of persons. 
The one modern approach that most satisfies the need for an ethical call is the 
kind of de ontological theory inspired by Kant. Here the subject is the rational 
subject that discovers universal ethical principles solely through the exercise of 
reason by way of the categorical imperative, principles that are completely 
independent of personal or collective inclinations and empirical conditions, and 
that should command our thinking in the same way that other rational truths 
claim the mind's assent. But we can notice in Kant's detached, abstract route to 
universal consistency something analogous to metaphysical subjectivism, as 
critiqued by Heidegger, particularly technicity's totalistic oblivion of Being and 
finite dwelling. The strict segregation of the good from personal concerns and 
from the contingencies of experience makes possible a kind of tyrannical formal-
ism that becomes blind to the actual conditions of existence and thereby not only 
inapplicable but dangerously inflexible (the good at any cost). 
In different ways, then, the orientation toward the subject in modern moral 
theory can be implicated in various problems that have continued to frustrate 
ethical discourse. Without claiming that Heidegger's thought can solve all these 
problems, I think his critique of subjectivity can give us a good start in addressing 
the underlying assumptions that foster these difficulties. First, we can see that 
Heidegger would object to "grounding" values in the subject no less than he 
would object to the "grounding" of any region of Being. But this does not annul 
values; it opens the realm of values to the overall configuration of finite being-in-
the-world. As with other concerns of Dasein, values can be understood as 
uncovered in Dasein's world and not simply in some inner subjective zone. As 
part of the world, values can be seen to have as much a "claim" on Dasei.Jl's 
understanding as other factical conditions into which it is "thrown." Notions 
such as facticity, thrownness, historicality (and, as we will see, Mitsein) that 
operate in Being and Time can give relief from individualistic and subjectivistic 
conceptions of values, as well as from a hyperbolic conception of existential 
freedom that in the end sees values as arbitrary choices. And regarding the 
difficulties indicated in utilitarianism and Kantian theory, I think that the phenom-
enological analysis of being-in that subverts the subject-object bifurcation initiated 
by Cartesian ontology can likewise open our understanding of values to a 
dimension "ecstatically" situated in world involvement, rather than simply the 
rational calculation of human preferences or the pure abstraction of universal con-
sistency. 
Perhaps now we can better understand Heidegger's notorious objections to the 
term "value." We know that much of this came from his obsession with protecting 
Being from a reduction to human interests. Beyond ontological considerations, I 
am convinced that the same can be said for the moral domain, that renouncing 
the value paradigm is not a rejection of ethical concerns but a protection of 
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their authentic meaning from the distortion of reducing them to merely human, 
subjective estimations. 14 
In general terms here we run up against the perennial problem of moral 
knowledge, of whether morality can have any cognitive status comparable to 
other modes of knowing. Much of modern philosophy has challenged the possibil-
ity of truth in ethics (especially positivism's inheritance of Hume's classic 
critique). But here again is the beauty of Heidegger's phenomenology. Ethics is 
indeed not a form of knowledge if truth is presumed to be the objective warrant 
of scientific rationality; values inhabit a realm of affectivity, uncertainty, contin-
gency, and disagreement. For Heidegger, however, all knowledge must be decon-
structed into the lived environment of the care structure, which amounts to a 
revision of what "knowledge" and "truth" mean. The aforementioned conditions 
of existential finitude are implicated in any form of knowing. In Being and Time 
traditional assumptions about strict objectivity are demolished but not in the 
direction of a radical skepticism or anti-realism. 15 The difference between suppos-
edly objective and non-objective disciplines can be understood now as the degree 
to which existential concerns are implicated in their disclosures. Consequently, 
the so-called exact sciences are simply less existentially operational than history, 
art, or ethics. 16 Given this continuum, ethics, in being simply more animated by 
existential concerns, cannot on that account alone be deemed any less "real," 
any less "knowable," or, especially, any less "true" -if we employ Heidegger's 
interpretation of truth as aletheia, as a finite, ungrounded, process of unconceal-
ment that can work for any form of disclosure. Heidegger should be read as a 
phenomenological realist, or, if you like, a radical realist, in that Being is 
disclosed through Dasein, not produced by Dasein (confusion and ambiguity on 
this point was part of the reason for the Kehre). But the disclosure of Being is a 
finite, dynamic, and pluralized process that subverts traditional philosophical 
confidences. The irony is, and this is a major contribution to moral philosophy, 
that the features of ethics that had often weakened its claims to knowledge and 
truth in traditional discourse can now be seen to strengthen those claims as long 
as knowledge and truth are given proper postmetaphysical alterations. 
1lI. ETHICS AND DWELLING 
Dwelling (Wohnen) is a word that occupied Heidegger's later thinking. But it is 
completely consistent with, and expressive of, the non-objective/non-subjective 
configuration of being-in-the-world delineated in the early writings.17 The word 
"dwelling" captures both "subjective" and "objective" tones (human meaning 
14Joseph Kockelmans makes this point in On the Truth of Being (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press. 
1984), pp. 258 and 261. A passage from Letter on Humanism lends credence to this interpretation: 
"To think against 'values' is not to maintain that everything ... is valueless .... through the 
characterization of something as a 'value' what is so valued is robbed of its worth .... what is valued 
is admitted only as an object for man's estimation" (p. 228). 
15See Being and Time, p. 195, where Heidegger speaks against randomness and bias-laden obstacles 
to knowledge, and p. 251, where he offers a partially favorable gesture toward philosophical realism. 
16Such a demarcation is suggested in Being and Time, p. 195. 
I7See Being and Time, p. 80, for the connection between dwelling, being, being-in, and being-in-
the-world. Also, in Letter on Humanism: "dwelling is the essence of being-in-the-world" (p. 236). 
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and the environment which we inhabit) but in a single, indivisible, existential 
term. The word in all its resonances becomes Heidegger's replacement for 
traditional subject-object ontologies. In Letter on Humanism Heidegger takes up 
the Greek word ethos in its sense of abode and dwelling place 18 and concludes 
that his ontological investigations might then be called an "original ethics" 
(p. 235). Although this answer is a typically unsatisfying "end run" around the 
specific question regarding the possibility of ethics in Heidegger's thinking, I 
believe that we can go beyond Heidegger's ontological fixation, that a normative 
ethics can benefit from attention to ethos-as-dwelling, that we can ask questions 
about how we dwell ethically, and how we should dwell in the world. Heidegger's 
notion of dwelling offers two main contributions to moral philosophy; the first 
points back to and summarizes preceding sections of my text, the second points 
forward to the rest of my essay: (1) values cannot be understood as either 
objective or subjective conditions-they are modes of being-in-the-world; (2) 
being-ethical-in-the-world must be understood as radically finite. 
For Heidegger, from beginning to end, from being-in-the-world to the fourfold 
(Geviert), dwelling means being at home in the finitude of Being, in its mixture of 
presence and absence, especially in terms of human mortality and the limit 
conditions of unconcealment. Dwelling is contrasted with the "flight" from Being 
indicated in the closure of metaphysical systems and the quest for certainty and 
control. Dwelling names something like what the poet John Keats called "negative 
capability," the capacity to live with conditions of uncertainty, 19 or as I would 
put it, a reconciliation with finitude. Although dwelling has a positive content 
suggesting a sense of placement in the world to counter radical versions of 
skepticism, phenomenalism, or anarchism, it also presents a deep challenge in 
that we must exist in a world without foundations, guarantees, or ultimate 
resolution of existential difficulties. 
The same radical finitude can be shown in our ethical dwelling. In fact, this 
finitude has always been acknowledged in moral philosophy, but it was deemed a 
deficiency that either needed correcting or prevented ethics from achieving 
intellectual legitimation. The moral life is always faced with cognitive, psychologi-
cal, empirical, and practical limits, which are effectively expressed in the mixture 
of presence and absence that rings in Heidegger's favorite word, aletheia, 
unconcealment: values are not grounded in proof or demonstration; the moral 
arena is marked by disagreement and conflict; moral situations are often complex 
and ambiguous, where outcomes are uncertain, where goods conflict with each 
other, where a balance of differing interests is hard to gauge-but we have to 
decide and sometimes all we are left with is an abyssal moment of choice; we 
sometimes fail in our aim for the good, or in doing good we sometimes instigate 
harmful effects; extreme or degraded environments can ruin ethical potential; 
ethical commitments often require risk and sacrifice, which makes anxiety and 
mixed dispositions inevitable. The value of Heidegger's notion of dwelling is that 
we are forced to give up the idea that such conditions of finitude are "deficien-
cies." This is the ethical world, and the myth of pure "presence" must be 
surrendered in moral philosophy no less than in ontology. The problem with 
'·See Charles Scott's evocative reading in The Question of Ethics, pp. 142-47. 
I9"Letter to George and Thomas Keats," December 1817. 
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ethical beliefs that insulate the good from limit conditions is not simply a 
philosophical flaw. There is an irony that history has demonstrated all too often: 
the "purer" the concept of the good, the greater the capacity to do evil on its 
behalf. With a definitized ideal the world now appears "fallen" and in need of 
reform; when elements in the world continue to resist or fall short, there arises a 
potential to commit terror in the name of "salvation." 
IV. HUMAN NATURE AND FINITUDE 
Heidegger's thought challenges traditional essentialist assumptions about hu-
man nature that have played an important role in moral philosophy. Do we not 
need to discover or posit something essential, universal, and unified in human 
nature to shape the idea of a "common good" that can overcome the divisive 
strife that plagues us? Is not the denial of a metaphysics of humanity a significant 
threat to ethics? This is an important question that faces postmodern thought, but 
I believe that a non-essentialist description of human existence can speak to many 
important problems in ethics. In the early Heidegger Dasein's radical finitude is 
indicated in its "transcendence," which means-as is made clear in What Is 
Metaphysics? and in the notion of being-toward-death-being held out into the 
Nothing. The core of Dasein is not a definable essence but an abyss that is not 
reducible to any state of being. But the abyssal dimension of human existence 
makes questioning and disclosure (from concealment to unconcealment) possible. 
It is also, for Heidegger, the origin of freedom, which addresses the need for 
decision and choice in ethics; radical finitude is also radical openness, the 
antithesis of deterministic closure. 
In addition, abyssal transcendence leaves us with a non-essentialist version of 
personhood that can, I think, intercept a number of morally problematic beliefs 
and practices. Many human abuses can be traced to reductionistic pictures of 
human nature, where the self is traced to some positive property or condition, be 
it individual, group, or universal reductions (e.g., egoism, tribalism, or Enlighten-
ment universalism). The trouble starts when an "other" is encountered (when 
the egoist encounters another ego, when the tribalist encounters another tribe, or 
when the universalist encounters differences or resistance to the presumed 
definition of "human nature"). To see the human person in non-essentialist terms 
is to refuse all reductions, to weigh potentiality more than actuality, concealment 
more than full disclosure, process more than finished states, uniqueness more 
than universality. What humans ultimately have in common, then, is the negativ-
ity of finitude, i.e., the fact that we do not have a definable "nature." But this 
negativity can help disrupt all the definitional references with which we frequently 
promote ourselves and demote others. Since human persons cannot ultimately be 
fixed by any designation, then all the abstract categories of race, gender, ethnic-
ity, class, and the like that fuel so much trouble can be intercepted by a negative 
correction. Such categories do have a use but not as substantive designations. 
The "other" becomes a mystery (in relation to our presumptions), which can 
cash out in ethics as a warning against fixed beliefs that are implicated in hatred, 
discrimination, exploitation, and abuse. 20 Although the negativity of radical 
2°John D. Caputo gives suggestions for ethics in this regard in Radical Hermeneutics (Bloomington: 
Indiana Univ. Press, 1987), chs. 9-10. 
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finitude might be unsettling, we should attend to the ways in which "positive" 
ascriptions are implicated in injustice. Renouncing such ascriptions can have an 
important consequence in ethics by gathering a Heideggerian word that has much 
moral resonance: Seinlassen. In letting-be there are tones of non-interference, 
openness, recognition, respect, and release. 21 
V. MITSEIN AND MITLEID 
The negative tone of the preceding analysis can be balanced somewhat by 
attention to the world configuration in Being and Time. The world in which 
Dasein dwells is the rich array of meanings and concerns that, though finite, give 
positive content to existence. One of the features of the world structure that is 
most pertinent to ethics is the phenomenon of Mitsein. "Dasein is essentially 
Being-with. "22 Being-with-other-Daseins is equiprimordial with being-in-the-
world. Mitsein is the basis of Dasein's everyday sense of self, which is not strictly 
speaking an "I" but das Man, the "they-self." Even authenticity is not a 
departure from Mitsein or even from das Man. 23 Here Heidegger is continuing a 
tradition (inspired by Hegel) that sees human existence as essentially social; the 
human self is primarily a "social self." We are not first and foremost isolated ego-
atoms that relate to other selves only secondarily. Everything from mutual 
dependence to child rearing to education to the phenomenon of recognition lends 
support to the idea that we become individuals only in and out of social relations. 
This is the sense in which Heidegger describes Mitsein as a world-phenomenon, 
as something in which we find our being. 24 
One of the consequences of Mitsein for ethics is that we are liberated from the 
philosophical problematic of "arguing" for a social context to challenge egoistic 
or individualistic paradigms. In various ways the individual is others; relationships 
come first. Being-in-a-with-world suggests the following. Like other conditions 
that Dasein is in, that are there, in which Dasein ec-statically dwells, the 
individual self and other selves are not separate or even merely in a "relation." 
We are co-constituted by each other, we "exist" in each other in certain ways 
(being "in" love is a significant example). Such a structure provides an effective 
2tDerrida addresses the ethical possibilities of letting-be in "Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay 
on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas," in Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: Univ. 
of Chicago Press, 1978). 
22Being and Time, p. 156. See primarily sections 25-27. 
23Authenticity is called a "modification" of das Man (Being and Time, p. 312). 
24Much of the analysis of das Man in Being and Time is influenced by Kierkegaard's critique of 
bourgeois conformity, which gives the impression that authenticity would involve the liberation of the 
unique individual from ordinary social patterns. But then we are told that authenticity is not a 
departure from da.l' Man but its modification, even that da.\· Man "is an existentiale; and, as a 
primordial phenomenon, it belongs to Dasein's positive constitution" (p. 167). This can make sense if 
we interpret das Man in a less pejorative way as socialization, as the necessarily "common" ways in 
which a person is incorporated into a cultural setting. Authenticity, then, would involve the tension 
between socialization and individuation, something that would never have to mean an asocial break 
but rather the particular, creative ways in which individuals cut their path within a social world. In 
this way authenticity would not mean isolated individuation; in fact it would remain essentially 
Mitsein. See the connection between death, individuation, and Mitsein (p. 309); see also the 
essential connection between authenticity, resolution, and being-with-others in Basic Problems of 
Phenomenology, pp. 287-88. 
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challenge to the hegemony of liberal individualism and its effect on moral 
discourse since the Modern period. Consider the following passages from Basic 
Problems: "Self and world belong together in a single entity, the Dasein" (p. 297). 
Since other selves are part of the world, a unitary constellation of selves is 
implied: "Dasein is determined from the very outset by being-with-others" 
(p. 296). Even the I-thou relation is something made possible by a more primordial 
world correlation: "The basic condition for this possibility of the self's being a 
possible thou in being-with others is based on the circumstance that the Dasein 
as the self that it is, is such that it exists as being-in-the-world. For 'thou' means 
'you who are with me in the world' " (pp. 297-98). Such a structure opens up the 
topology of ethical relations. Since "self" is not ontologically individuated in the 
strict sense, even the "mineness" of Dasein does not suggest a confinement to 
individual self-interest but rather an openness to the interests of others. The for-
the-sake-of-itself of Dasein "does not assert ontically that the factual purpose of 
the facti cal Dasein is to care exclusively and primarily for itself and to use others 
as instruments (Werkzeug) toward this end" (p. 296). In fact selfhood as a world 
phenomenon is "the ontological presupposition for the selflessness in which 
every Dasein comports itself toward the other in the existent I-thou relation-
ships" (p. 298). 
The idea that Dasein dwells with and in others helps us illuminate a phenome-
non that is often addressed in ethics, namely, compassion. Some moral philoso-
phers have made compassion the centerpiece of their ethics (e.g., Hume and 
Schopenhauer), and I think the notion of finite being-in-the-world can go a long 
way toward strengthening such reflections and opening up important possibilities 
for moral philosophy. 
Many of our values prescribe that we help others in need and refrain from 
abusing each other. The presence of compassion can be an effective force in 
living out these values (and its absence can account for not living them out). As 
shown in the words com-passion, sym-pathy. and Mit-leid, here we encounter an 
experience that "suffers-with," i.e., we share the pain of others. Compassion 
occurs when someone's misfortune actually touches us and alters our experience 
toward their pain and "calls" us in a visceral way to do something about it. The 
marvel of compassion is that the pain arises in us even when we ourselves are not 
directly undergoing the misfortune. How is something like this possible? I think 
that the notions of Mitsein and being-in help to show how compassion is 
possible, and indeed the phenomenon of compassion is a perfect illustration of 
the existential validity of Heidegger's configuration of being-in-the-world. In 
compassion we are decentered, desubjectivized, our experience dwells in the 
other, and so it cannot be understood as a subjective or objective condition but 
rather as a curious, compelling. ecstatic being-with-the-other. Compassion, then, 
may be the deepest indication of Mitsein. 25 There are a number of studies 
25In Being and Time Heidegger speaks to this point by saying "only on the basis of Being-with does 
'empathy' become possible" (p. 162). The German word here is Einfuhlung, not Mitleid. These two 
words are not exactly synonymous in German, but they overlap enough in the matter of sharing the 
experiences of others to make this passage fit my point well enough. In fact, Einfuhlung is the 
stronger, more heartfelt experience, and the "ein" captures an ecstatic sense of dwelling more sharply 
than "mit" does; moreover, "fuhlen" can apply to more positive ecstases and not simply to the 
sensitivity to misfortune. 
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suggesting that compassion is something natural in humans, even in very young 
children, that it is not simply a matter of social conditioning. 26 If this is right, then 
moral theories like egoism or utilitarianism that focus exclusively on self-interest 
are seriously flawed. But indifference might be no less natural, either. Neverthe-
less the issue of compassion and indifference can be given more force if we see 
them as basic existential conditions; this would deepen ethical discourse to the 
heart of our being. Might it be, for example, that compassion is a basic ethical 
disposition (Befindlichkeit) or mood (Stimmung) that attunes us to the moral life 
in a way that mere knowledge, theories, or rules cannot? And might there be 
ways to cultivate this attunement or prevent its eclipse by other factors in the 
social environment? 
One thing is clear (and this is a thoroughly Heideggerian insight): attention to 
our finitude can open up the world in new ways; there is a fundamental connection 
between limit conditions and the disclosure of meaning. Specifically, our own 
sufferings can open us to noticing and feeling the sufferings of others. As in the 
relationship between being-toward-death and care, our experience of limits and 
loss can not only illuminate the urgency of our own concerns and vulnerability; it 
might be the best teacher in coming to care for others as well. Although human 
beings and cultures might differ in their forms of life, there is, I think, a common 
human understanding of finitude, of what it means to lose one's interests. 
Compassion in the face of pain, loss, and death can be the starting point for a 
cross-cultural ethics. 
It should also be clear that compassion cannot be sufficient for an ethics. It is 
not possible for human beings to experience compassion universally or continu-
ally. There will always be a limit to our experiential concern; some people will 
always count more to us than others, and heightened compassion whenever it 
occurs will not last indefinitely. But ethics can still draw on compassion as a 
familiar and esteemed phenomenon that helps articulate the ethical field, that 
serves as a reference for many of our values, and that therefore can function as a 
kind of "measure" (this is Werner Marx's term) for our ethical thinking and our 
allegiance to moral formulations that are cast in the non-affective, abstract form 
of rules, principles, obligations, etc. It would be naive to think that ethics and 
moral education can do without principles or the duty-inclination dynamic. But 
compassion can still serve as an effective focus for public discourse about 
regulations, maxims, laws, and government, all of which can in a way be called 
the ethical "lieutenants" of compassion; that is to say, laws and principles "stand 
in" for compassion, direct our behavior in its absence in accordance with its 
"measure," and in so doing ensure a more ethical world when its existential fuel 
is empty or low. 27 
VI. COURAGE 
Aristotle's ethics focuses on virtues, or character traits and capacities, that are 
needed to lead a good life and to decide and act in the proper manner in ethical 
'oSee Alvin I. Goldman, "Empathy, Mind, and Morals," Proceedings and Addresses of the 
American Philosophical Association 66, no. 3 (1992), 17-41. 
27See Werner Marx, Towards a Phenomenological Ethics, pp. 56-67. For another perspective that 
considers justice in terms of the tension between universals and singularities, see John D. Caputo, 
"Hyperbolic Justice: Deconstruction, Myth, and Politics," Research in Phenomenology 21 (1991), 
3-20. 
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situations. Virtue ethics has made something of a comeback recently,28 focusing 
less on rules and principles and more on the kind of person it takes to act 
ethically. Much in my analysis relates to such an approach, and I want to focus 
briefly on the virtue of courage with respect to an ethics of finitude. 
Aristotle defines courage in relation to pain. The courageous person is one who 
can stand fast in pursuit of a good in the midst of pain or the risk of pain. A 
coward is someone who cannot or does not act for the good because of pain or 
fear of pain. 29 Although Aristotle's discussion generally focuses on the obvious 
example of courage in battle, I think we can add in all sorts of pains, losses, and 
risks and consequently greatly expand the meaning of courage and cowardice in 
the ethical domain. In fact to a large extent I think that courage could be called 
the primary virtue in the moral life, and our analysis of finitude can help articulate 
why this might be so. 
I have said that Heidegger's analysis of being-in-the-world involves a reconcilia-
tion with finitude, with the limit conditions of existence. One way of understand-
ing the notion of fallenness (Verfallen) is that it is a hyperimmersion in beings as 
a refuge from radical finitude. Part of authenticity, then, involves a release from 
this fixation and a capacity to dwell finitely, to accept the movements of presence 
and absence more readily. It seems to me that such a capacity is exactly what 
courage means in our being-ethical-in-world. So much of our possessive and 
abusive behavior that is morally problematical can be understood as stemming 
from the fear of finitude, of the pain of lacks and losses. A good deal of greed, 
anger, and violence can be traced to the "fallenness" of self-absorption as a 
refuge from losses or the threat of losses (which losses can be material, psycho-
logical, social, ideological, etc.). Even moderation and self-control can involve 
courage in that the person who indulges appetites at the expense of himself or 
others is cowardly in the sense of not being able to withstand the "pain" of an 
unfulfilled desire (experienced as a "lack"). 
Moreover, courage and cowardice help explain how and why we often fail to 
live up to an ethic we affirm in principle and want to enact. In many respects 
acting according to moral values involves risks, sacrifices, and uncertainties, 
which makes such enactment difficult and challenging. Honesty, for example, is 
not something that is risk-free or cost-free. The honest person is courageous in 
the sense of accepting such conditions, and the liar is in this respect a coward. So 
we could conclude that liars are not really affirming deceit as a "good" as much 
as they are fearing the consequences of telling the truth. If we recall a previous 
point about the role of tradition, we can say that a key task in ethics is not a 
radical challenge to our values (who would want to propose the abandonment of 
truth-telling?) but a recognition of how much courage it takes to lead a moral 
life. 30 It might even be possible to extend this virtue to the question of compassion 
and say that compassion takes courage and that indifference is a subtle form of 
cowardice, a psychological strategy to ward off the pain of real attention to 
280ne work responsible for this is Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Univ. of Notre Dame 
Press. 1981). 
29See Nicomachean Ethics III, 6-9. 
30Sometimes the risks come from social pressures against being ethical. This is why it is wrong to 
assume that everydayness is the realm of ethics and that authenticity is a non-ethical sphere. 
Sometimes das Man is a strong anti-ethical force, as in the case of honesty. 
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human suffering. This analysis of the virtue of courage augments a central 
conviction of my essay, that an authentic ethical existence can be seen to mirror 
Heidegger's broader conception of authenticity, in being able to dwell in the 
finitude of ethical situations and decisions. 
VII. DECISION 
Given limit conditions and uncertamtIes in ethical dwelling, we must still 
decide. And often we must decide to rebel against an established convention, to 
disrupt it in our resolve. And even if we are clear about the good, ethics is finally 
action, which means that we must decide to enact the good in the midst of 
counter-possibilities, which makes being ethical in the end spontaneous, without 
cognitive or social support. The openness of Dasein's temporal futurity is an 
ineradicable condition of moral engagement. Ethics at bottom is groundless, but 
we must accept its finitude and still decide how to act. 
The problem with traditional moral theories is that they want to "definitize" 
ethics by grounding the good in some fixed scheme; and they bypass the abyssal 
element of existential decision by modeling ethical deliberation along the lines of 
demonstrative and calculative techniques that in a sense decide things "for" us (I 
do not "decide," for example, that 2 plus 2 is 4 or that "Socrates is mortal," in 
the classic syllogism). Demonstrative "decidability," in fact, would erase the 
sense of responsibility for choices that also animates ethicsY As I have said, it is 
not that these theories are mistaken. The familiar models in moral philosophy all 
show us something important in ethics but fail in their reductive groundings and 
exclusions. The ongoing and unsettled debates between egoism, utilitarianism, 
deontology, libertarianism, communitarianism, and so on, deconstruct into the 
elements of finitude sketched in this essay. Ethics, like any other form of 
unconcealment, is a mixture and oscillation of presence and absence. When we 
focus, for example, on group interests, we conceal individuality, and vice versa; 
when we focus on principles, we conceal empirical contingencies, and vice versa; 
when we focus on obligation, we conceal inclination, and vice versa. The point is 
that ethical situations usually involve a complicated interplay and tension of these 
concerns-this is the difficulty of ethical life. Authentic decisions do not have to 
mean "correct" decisions but something like the attentive ethical finesse of 
Aristotle's phronesis, a deliberative capacity for responsive and responsible 
choice. But as radically finite, an existential finesse would hold more of a tremble 
than Aristotle's comfortable tone would suggest. To balance this discomfort we 
should keep in mind the non-subjective features of Heidegger's world configura-
tion so that ethics is not taken to be so radically finite as to seem arbitrary. Moral 
commitment, though uncertain, has its truth. 
31Derrida develops this point in terms of the connection between ethical decisions and undecidability 
in the Afterword of Limited Inc., ed. Gerald Graf (Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press, \988). 
